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In an increasingly connected world where technology and information are 
easily accessible to the consumer, what, if anything, is being done to protect the 
information and identity of private individuals? Through the use of the internet and 
data that is accumulated from users’ profiles, Governments and Corporations access 
and compile data sets on targeted groups and individuals “of interest” in an 
unprecedented manner. 
The collection and analysis of data is a concern related to international human 
rights and international relations. It implicates issues of sovereignty and highlights 
the lack of international agreeance on how to address these issues and to protect 
private information. 
A key area of concern is the right to privacy and how governments may be 
exploiting the collection of data from individuals to violate their right to privacy, and 
in some cases to commit serious human rights violations. I will first outline the policy 
and background of the use of Big Data in international human rights. Secondly, 
against this backdrop, I will look at the use of Big Data by Russia and by China. 
Third, I will analyze the proposed models for assessment and protection of human 
rights in conjunction with the critiques and suggestions made by scholars in this field. 
Finally, I will discuss the potential for an international system to be developed and 
implemented to both enable human rights monitoring using Big Data, while at the 
same time providing protections against violations of the right to privacy and other 
human rights laws. 
II. POLICY AND BACKGROUND 
In order to properly discuss and analyze the current framework, [or lack 
thereof], surrounding Big Data, requires a basic overview of how Big Data operates 
and what the current standpoints are on its use. First, how is Big Data currently 
understood and legislated on by governments and the international community? 
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Big Data is a “gather in bulk, access in detail”1 monitoring and compiling of 
information; it is a new surveillance system that is categorically different from 
traditional methods of surveillance and gathering information. As a result, a broad 
range of human rights are implicated in the use of Big Data as a surveillance tool.2 
Another term by which the same process is known, is “bulk communications data 
techniques,” or “bulk data” which involves “the large-scale collection, retention and 
subsequent analysis of communications data . . . of which by nature, an exhaustive 
analysis of this highly dynamic area is problematic. Indeed, it is precisely these 
limitations that challenge the applicability of current human rights law tests.”3 
The understanding of Big Data can be broken down into three stages: the 
gathering and collecting of data; the automated analysis of data which includes 
algorithmic filtering; and the human examination of the results of that analysis of 
filtering.4 The breakdown between these stages is where a split over semantics arises. 
The key question is when, or at what stage, does “surveillance” actually take place? 
The argument can be made that surveillance happens at the first stage—that the very 
act of gathering or collecting data is surveillance. Privacy advocates and some 
scholars will argue this point, focusing on the fact that individuals are constantly 
having their data collected—from cookies on websites they access or to their 
geolocation—which fundamentally impacts or changes the way that we behave, and 
this constitutes “surveillance.” Others argue that surveillance does not take place 
until the third stage, where human involvement and analysis of the data occurs, and 
that it is the human element of viewing and analyzing the data that constitutes 
“surveillance.”5 This view enables the claim that the population is free from “mass 
surveillance” because the human element is introduced only after the data has been 
analyzed to determine, reveal, or surface, those individuals who may be of particular 
concern to the surveillant power. 
Author Paul Bernal makes the argument that it is at the first stage, the collection 
or gathering of data, that the “rights-balancing exercise” should start.6 Bernal points 
out that this new form of surveillance has human rights implications that surpass 
privacy concerns, claiming that Articles 6 the right to a fair trial, 8(1) the right to 
                                                          
1 Paul Bernal, Data Gathering, Surveillance and Human Rights: Recasting the Debate, 1 J. OF 
CYBER POL’Y 243, 246 (2016). 
2 Id. at 247. 
3 Daragh Murray & Pete Fussey, Bulk Surveillance in the Digital Age: Rethinking the Human Rights 
Law Approach to Bulk Monitoring of Communications Data, 52 ISR. L. REV. 31, 31 (2019). 
4 Bernal, supra note 1, at 249. 
5 Id. 
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respect for private and family life—which extends to protection of “his 
correspondence,” 9 the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 10 the 
right to freedom of expression, 11 the right to freedom of assembly and association, 
and 14 the prohibition against discrimination, of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) are implicated by this new system.7 
This new method of surveillance can uncover habits, preferences, and “to a 
reasonable probability religion, sexual preferences, political leanings and more . . . 
data gathering can therefore impact upon any aspect of a private life” and can expose 
those personal characteristics.8 According to Bernal, this kind of profiling, through 
analysis of data collected, can bring Article 9 of the ECHR into play.9 Article 9 
implicates the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and may only 
be subject to limitations which are “prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety etc.”10 This right may be 
undermined by the use of the profiles compiled through the new surveillance system 
under Big Data. Additionally, the ability to analyse individual users’ data, in the 
context of all of the data collected, facilitates the identification of “anonymous” users 
who may use software or practices to hide their identity. By analyzing their activity 
in the context of the larger pool of activity, patterns or overlaps can be identified.11 
While this may be beneficial to determining the network within which a potential 
threat to national security may come from, there is ample opportunity for this type 
of system to be abused to identify vulnerable members of minority groups, such as 
LGBTQ+ or members of marginalized or persecuted religious or ethnic groups. 
As previously noted, an awareness of surveillance can affect one’s behavior—
“knowing one’s online activities are subject to government interception and 
believing these surveillance practices are necessary for national security play 
important roles in influencing conformist behavior.”12 That influence, Stoycheff 
concludes, “is in effect a chilling of speech, particularly of minority opinion.”13 
Surveillance can be used to identify those with a minority opinion (cultural, political, 
religious, etc.) and can be used to prevent them from accessing information. When 
                                                          
7 Id. at 252; see also European Convention on Human Rights, arts. 6, 8–11, 14, Mar. 9, 1953, E.T.S. 
No. 005. 
8 Bernal, supra note 1, at 253. 
9 Id. 
10 European Convention on Human Rights, arts. 6, 8–11, 14, Mar. 9, 1953, E.T.S. No. 005 
[hereinafter ECHR]. 
11 Murray & Fussey, supra note 3, at 39. 
12 Elizabeth Stoycheff, Under Surveillance: Examining Facebook’s Spiral of Silence Effects in the 
Wake of NSA Internet Monitoring, 93 JOURNALISM & MASS COMMC’N. Q. 296, 297 (2016). 
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considered in conjunction with geolocation data—which enables authorities to 
physically locate individuals and potentially those wishing to assemble—this 
chilling effect on speech and minority opinion becomes that much more severe. Put 
simply: 
In the context of surveillance, a chilling effect is said to 
arise when individuals refrain from engaging in certain 
forms of activity because of the perceived consequences 
if that activity is observed. Any chilling effect 
immediately brings into play rights such as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and freedom of 
assembly, as it will impact upon the ability of individuals 
to freely access information, to develop their 
understanding of specific issues, to engage in 
communication—or meet—with particular individuals or 
organisations, and so on.14 
According to the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex 
Association (ILGA), 72 countries prohibit same-sex relations.15 Surveillance 
technologies give governments the ability to “out” individuals. They know where 
people sleep at night, and with whom. The potential for lives to be destroyed is very 
great, indeed.16 
The new surveillance can not only enable discrimination, it may also automate 
it by controlling decisions and options available to a person on the basis of the profile 
built through collecting that person’s data. The person involved, whose decisions and 
options are being controlled, may never know what is happening.17 As noted above, 
this implicates most clearly, Article 10, and 14 of ECHR, by impeding an 
individual’s ability to “receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference” (Art. 10), and the prohibition against discrimination “on any ground 
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, association with a national minority, etc.” (Art. 14).18 A dangerous 
system may be created where individuals who belong to a minority group may be 
unintentionally exposing themselves to the risk of being targeted via surveillance, 
simply by accessing the internet. There is a large opportunity for this information to 
                                                          
14 Murray & Fussey, supra note 3, at 43–44. 
15 Aengus Carroll & Lucas Ramon Mendos, STATE SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA, A WORLD SURVEY 
OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAWS: CRIMINALISATION, PROTECTION, AND RECOGNITION 8 (12th ed. 2017), 
https://ilga.org/downloads/2017/ ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2017_WEB.pdf. 
16 Andrew Thompson, How Governments use Big Data to Violate Human Rights, THE INT’L F. FOR 
RESPONSIBLE MEDIA BLOG (Jan. 20, 2019), https://inforrm.org/2019/01/20/how-governments-use-big-
data-to-violate-human-rights-andrew-thompson/. 
17 Bernal, supra note 1, at 257–58. 
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be exploited and used to track down and expose vulnerable members of minority 
groups (i.e., LGBTQ+ and religious minority groups). 
Despite this doom and gloom approach to the issues that Big Data and 
surveillance creates, there is value to the information that Big Data provides, and the 
way that it can assist in preventing attacks, human rights abuses, and even protecting 
information and data. Amnesty International and other human rights groups have 
adapted to the use of Big Data and developed an analytical system which can help to 
prevent human trafficking and can be used to prevent or pinpoint other human rights 
abuses. Bulk communications data can be analyzed to identify suspicious patterns of 
behaviour, using a more proactive form of analysis individuals and devices “worthy 
of further investigation” can be revealed.19 Data retention is beneficial for solving 
and preventing crimes, and for speedier investigations.20 This can be used to create 
a profile on individuals or groups that may pose a threat to public safety or national 
security and enable preventative measures to be taken before an act is carried out. 
However, this use of data as well as the “new surveillance” use of data 
collection does not take place in a vacuum. They raise issues of sovereignty as well 
as issues caused by a lack of an established framework. Without an such framework 
in both approaches, Big Data can take place and be monitored. Finally, preventing 
abuses needs to be addressed under each approach. 
III. COUNTRY STUDIES 
Data surveillance is currently happening all over the world, including with 
Russia’s collection of information on LGBTQ+ populations and with China’s 
campaign against Uyghur Muslims. This portion of the paper will analyse and 
compare the situations in Russia and China and look at how the uninhibited access 
to data and surveillance is enabling the perpetration of these actions against targeted 
groups. 
A. Russia and LGBTQ+ 
June 30, 2014, President Putin signed a federal anti-LGBTQ+ propaganda law 
making it illegal to disseminate propaganda, defined as: “[The] distribution of 
information that is aimed at the formation among minors of non-traditional sexual 
attitudes, attractiveness or non-traditional sexual relations, misperceptions of the 
social equivalence of a traditional and non-traditional sexual relations, or enforcing 
                                                          
19 Murray & Fussey, supra note 3, at 38. 
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information about non-traditional sexual relations that evokes interest to such 
relations.”21 
This anti-propaganda law specifically targets the sharing of any information 
regarding LGBTQ+ identities and orientations, making the sharing of any 
information about such identities an illegal act.22 This law has had varied 
consequences. On the one hand there has been push-back from the international 
community and NGOs supporting LGBTQ+ rights. On the other, this categorization 
of LGBT+ as illegal has led to greater prosecution and attacks against the LGBTQ+ 
community.23 The further classification of an entire group of people as taboo and 
their identities as something that is illegal to discuss, has dire legal consequences as 
well. “Legally LGBTQ+ people are barely recognized as a social group, that is why 
crimes of violence cannot be classified as hate crimes and a motive of hostility cannot 
be recognized as aggravating circumstances.”24 
How is this treatment of the LGBTQ+ community by the state implicating Big 
Data? There have been multiple credible reports of “purges” of LGBTQ+ people in 
2017 in the Chechen Republic.25 Stories of the violence confirm that the threats and 
actions against LGBTQ+ people were based solely on their belonging to the 
LGBTQ+ community.26 “[A] number of offences has increased objectively since 
traditional political discourse is cultivating people’s homophobia that allows 
aggressors to get support, impunity and a free hand to demonstrate their negative 
attitude towards LGBTQ+ people.”27 
The Russian Government’s law enforcement agencies are able to require that 
companies, which the agency adds to a register, must hand over their consumer data 
                                                          
21 No Support: Russia’s “Gay Propaganda” Law Imperils LGBT Youth, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/12/11/no-support/russias-gay-propaganda-law-imperils-lgbt-
youth#page (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Monitoring of Discrimination and Violence Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in 
Russia in 2016–2017, RUSSIAN LGBT NETWORK (2018), https://lgbtnet.org/sites/default/files/ 
discrimination.pdf. 
25 Adam Taylor, Ramzan Kadyrov Says There Are No Gay Men in Chechnya—and if there Are Any, 
They Should Move to Canada, WASH. POST, July 15 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
worldviews/wp/2017/07/15/ramzan-kadyrov-says-there-are-no-gay-men-in-chechnya-and-if-there-are-
any-they-should-move-to-canada/; see also Monitoring of Discrimination and Violence Based on Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity in Russia in 2016–2017, supra note 24 (reporting of discrimination and 
violence against LGBT people in 2016–2017). 
26 Monitoring of Discrimination and Violence Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in 
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to the government agency on demand.28 If a company refuses to comply, the agency 
can block that company from having access to the Russian networks.29 “Many 
popular home-grown email, messaging and social media websites are already on the 
Russian register.”30 Thus, the Russian government has access to the data of anyone 
who uses these websites, and can require that data at any point and for any reason. 
In 2019, Tinder was added to such a register, and the Russian agency demanded 
that the company hand over its user data.31 Tinder was not already on a register 
because it is a foreign company. If Tinder wants to continue to have access to the 
“market” in Russia, then it must comply with the agency, or risk being blocked from 
having access to Russia. If Tinder does comply with this demand, the repercussions 
would be potentially devastating. Government officials, such as the leader of the 
Chechen Republic could have access to data that would enable them to track down 
LGBTQ+ citizens.32 This is a very real concern, as the 2017 purges demonstrate the 
open hostility of the government and what such a government is capable of. These 
purges, where individuals suspected of being LGBTQ+ were detained and tortured 
by those acting on behalf of the government, were addressed by Kadyrov, the 
Chechen leader, as not happening because “there are no gay men in Chechnya.”33 
This outright denial of the existence of a group of people, coupled with the actions 
taken to silence and oppress them, demonstrate that if Tinder were to comply with 
this demand, it would be putting LGBTQ+ people at risk of further targeted 
persecution by the Russian government. One scholar said, “[i]t would be grossly, 
unjustifiably irresponsible for the brand to release information that could reveal 
swipers’ sexual preferences to a government with a record of open hostility to its 
LGBTQ+ community.”34 
Not only is this “outing” by the government a gross violation of the right to 
privacy, it creates serious repercussions and risks for the outed individual to exist 
both in public as well as in private. An LGBTQ+ person is at risk of their family and 
                                                          
28 Andrew Osborn, Tinder, Despite Cooperation, Says It Hasn’t Shared User Data with Russia Yet, 




31 Rachel Altman, Tinder’s Data Sharing Endangers Russian LGBTQ Community, USA TODAY, 
June 14, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/06/14/tinder-data-sharing-russia-
endangers-lgbtq-community-column/1350929001/. 
32 Id. 
33 Taylor, supra note 25. 
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friends attacking them for their sexuality or identity as a result of the “tribe” 
mentality and the potential for honor killings due to the shame of having an LGBTQ+ 
person in their family or tribe.35 “Both authorities and local society apply pressure 
on [the] family to punish [LGBTQ+ people].”36 
This use of data by the state, to target and track a community of people for the 
express purpose of attacking them, is a stark example of the potential for misuse of 
data by organizations. Unfettered access to data compilations on society, and on 
groups of people, creates a myriad of opportunities to exploit the information and 
expose these vulnerable communities to serious risk of violence. The fact that there 
is no check on the use of data, and that the Russian government is able to demand 
access to data from private corporations and entities, creates a serious concern for 
the potential for human rights violations. At this point, other than outrage from the 
international community, which has taken the form of protests and sanctions against 
the Russian government, no real action has taken place to curtail the treatment of the 
LGBTQ+ community in Russia by the government. More to the point, nothing has 
been done to address the use of data in this treatment, and how continued access to 
data poses a serious risk to marginalized and vulnerable populations. There is no 
international structure through which the Russian government’s use of data can be 
held accountable and prevented. 
B. China and Uyghur Muslims 
The use of data surveillance in China has been incredibly prevalent specifically 
in regard to the use of surveillance measures to identify and track ethnic Muslims in 
the Xinjiang region of the country. This situation provides a direct look at the 
potential that surveillance through Big Data has through the human rights abuses and 
issues that this presents. 
At a presentation on surveillance measures proposed or already in use in China, 
this slogan was displayed: “If someone exists, there will be traces, and if there are 
connections, there will be information.”37 Xinjiang China has become the 
“incubator” for implementing surveillance systems for tracking and identifying the 
population in that region and uses these systems to discriminate against minority 
groups, specifically members of Muslim ethnic groups. A New York Times 
investigation found that “China is in effect hard-wiring Xinjiang for segregated 
                                                          
35 Lucas Ramón Mendos, State-Sponsored Homophobia 2019, ILGA WORLD, Mar. 2019, at 1, 156, 
https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2019 _light.pdf. 
36 Id. 
37 Chris Buckley & Paul Mozur, How China Uses High-Tech Surveillance to Subdue Minorities, 
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surveillance, using an army of security personnel to compel ethnic minorities to 
submit to monitoring and data collection.”38 This monitoring is conducted by the 
C.E.T.C. platform, which police use via a mobile app to enter data into the system, 
tracking information such as people who may “have stopped using a smartphone, 
have begun avoiding the use of the front door . . . , or have refueled someone else’s 
car.”39 The police use the app at “checkpoints” which serve as virtual fences. The 
system can be set to trigger an alarm every time that person tries to leave a 
neighborhood or enters a public place.40 
State surveillance of the population has led to members of the targeted group 
attempting to distance themselves from others who could expose their identity, or 
who may be implicated or punished for a connection to them. Many Uyghurs living 
in Turkey do not have contact with their families in China for this reason. They have 
been deleted from social media and have no contact due to the fear of punishment 
from the Chinese authorities.41 
Surveillance is not just an aspect of the online lives of people living in China, 
in the Xinjiang province this level of scrutiny is a part of everyday life. People 
travelling through the province or returning home from other areas of China are 
subjected to facial scanning by police when they arrive in the province.42 There are 
surveillance devices located everywhere in public, “at the entrances to every 
supermarket, mall, and hospital.”43 According to a Dutch cybersecurity expert, there 
are police checkpoints and security cameras which have been, and continue to, record 
the location data of citizens in the Xinjiang province.44 This surveillance includes a 
database of the names and identification information (birth dates, ID card numbers, 
photos, and employment details) of people who the government is monitoring.45 The 
government maintains a tight net of surveillance over Uyghurs in China, and focusses 
this surveillance on the Xinjiang province due to its proximity to Turkey and its large 
                                                          
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. (The New York Times quoting Human Rights Watch.). 
41 Isobel Cockerell, Inside China’s Massive Surveillance Operation, WIRED (May 9, 2019, 
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/inside-chinas-massive-surveillance-operation/. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Chris Baynes, Chinese ‘Muslim Tracker’ Surveillance System Monitoring Movements of 2.5m 
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population of Uyghurs.46 In addition to the existing surveillance in the province, 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) has stated that they believe the Chinese Ministry of 
Public Security is working to pilot a system to monitor telephone conversations, 
further violating the right to privacy, and the protections which should be in place.47 
C. Section III Conclusion 
A key takeaway from this is that the government in China is exercising 
unprecedented control through surveillance and is using this information to monitor 
and target a specific ethnic group. There is no regulation in place to prevent the use 
of data and surveillance for such a purpose, no framework under which such 
exploitation of information is made illegal, or no location where states and private 
actors can be held accountable for their use of data. These same challenges are 
present in the situation in Russia. Currently there is no functioning framework that 
can be effectively used to address these concerns. 
Self-regulation by states of their own collection and use of data is not enough 
to properly address a growing issue, and as evidenced by the above case studies, it is 
not working. Such self-regulation is even less effective in non-democratic states, 
where there is not an internal political check on the government’s exercise of power. 
However, this does not mean that democratic states are much further ahead in 
preventing the exploitation of data by the government and by private actors. This 
facet of the issue has largely been overlooked by scholars and experts who seek to 
propose regulation models for the use of data. Most of these proposed models are for 
democratic states and do not take into consideration the application to non-
democratic states. 
IV. PROPOSED MODELS 
Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union sets out 
the foundation of data protection laws in the EU and establishes several key 
requirements concerning data processing activities.48 This article states that 
“everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning [them].” And 
that “such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of 
                                                          
46 Cockerell, supra note 41. 
47 Id. 
48 Krysztof Garstka, Between Security and Data Protection: Searching for a Model of a Legal Big 
Data Surveillance Scheme within the European Union Data Protection Framework, THE HUM. RTS., BIG 
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the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by 
law.” (emphasis added).49 
The codification of the UN Charter right to privacy, in the circumstances of Big 
Data, is an important step in influencing international law towards development of a 
policy for the use of data, and to create and implement an international framework 
for Big Data and surveillance. 
A. For Assessment 
1. Proportionality Assessment 
The 2018 Annual Report from the Office of the High Chancellor for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) lays out how privacy, as a right, should be protected, and that if it 
is to be “limited” then such a limit is subject to a proportionality test or assessment: 
Privacy and other related rights shall only be limited when 
necessary. If a measure is necessary, a proportionality 
assessment shall be carried out following a three-step test: 
First, the measure which is taken must be potentially 
capable of realizing the aim. Secondly, the measure which 
is taken is required to reach the aim (in other words it must 
be the least intrusive measure). Thirdly, the measure 
which is taken must be proportionate “strictu sensu.”50 
Proportionality is one of the pillars of international law, both in international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law (law of armed conflicts). This 
concept requires that a balancing test be applied—before the act is undertaken, and 
with the information available to the individual at the time—to determine if the 
military advantage, or “gain” outweighs the casualties or “harm” caused.51 
Here, the balancing is not only taking place in an armed conflict, but also in 
times of relative peace or stability. The harm contemplated is the violation of several 
recognized international human rights—undermining an individual’s right to 
privacy, and several other rights which are related to or flow from privacy, such as 
the right to assembly, to freedom of thought and association etc.52 In order to measure 
the gain from using Big Data, this balancing test should be undertaken on a case-by-
case basis, and not generalized to include the potential gain the entire structure would 
provide. In such a circumstance, the gain may be the potential to reveal a member of 
                                                          
49 Commission Proclamation on Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, 2000 
O.J. (C 364) 1, 10 (Dec. 7, 2000). 
50 United Nations, Human Rights Report 2018, 1, 9 (2018), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
charter/pdf/text_en.pdf. 
51 For the purposes of this paper, the terms “gain” and “harm” will be used when discussing a 
proportionality assessment, rather than “military advantage” and “cost.” 
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a group planning an attack, which in the abstract may be presented as outweighing 
the collective right to the protection of privacy. Rather, the analysis should be 
particularized, as with case study of Russia, and the actions taken by the government 
agency towards requiring Tinder to release private data. There, a proportionality 
balancing test would show that the harm of violation of the right to privacy of people 
in general, but also of a specific and targeted minority group, outweighs any gain 
that the government may propose to receive from such information. 
Similarly, in the case study of China, weighing the government’s increased 
surveillance and tracking of citizens in the Xinjiang province violates the right to 
privacy, freedom of speech, and assembly as well as other related rights. The 
potential gain which the government may get from such surveillance is that the 
government can take preventative measures to stop any potential attacks or actions 
by rebels in the area. However, the question remains whether this level of harm is 
proportional to the “gain” the government receives. Arguably, it is not. The entire 
lives of a specific targeted minority group are catalogued and tracked based solely 
on their group characteristic of religion and ethnicity. This level of surveillance and 
complete violation of privacy is applied without discrimination to all members of the 
group, pre-emptively and without there needing to be an establishment of any kind 
of threshold activity to flag such an individual as being of interest to the government. 
Furthermore, there are multiple reports coming out about how the government in the 
Xinjiang province is compiling databases with this surveillance information and 
using them to detain Uyghurs. Such an unchecked use of the power of the state with 
the use of data is a serious challenge to human rights. 
The consideration of the potential harms and gains associated with the 
protection of personal data should be undertaken with the above case studies in mind. 
The potential harms flowing from the use of data in such a way include: honor 
killings, torture, imprisonment, ostracization, and a lack of security. While the gain 
to be had from continued access to data by a state may be presented as the potential 
to address or prevent threats to national security, such gains must be considered on 
a case-by-case basis with the facts of the situation at hand as they arise. These cases 
should not be generalized due to a fear for allowing broad state action without any 
consequence or check on that power. 
2. Human Rights Law assessment of legitimacy of surveillance measures 
Under human rights law, for a surveillance measure to be considered legitimate, 
it must satisfy each prong of the following three-part test. First, it requires a domestic 
legal basis for surveillance to take place, such as legislation in place directly 
addressing or contemplating the use of surveillance. If such a basis exists, then it 
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individuals.”53 This prong requires that the surveillance measure taken would be 
legal under that nation’s legal framework, that the surveillance does not interfere 
arbitrarily with an individual’s rights, and that the measures are targeted and specific 
enough to extract the necessary information without creating a legal issue 
surrounding other rights, or other individual’s rights. The second prong requires that 
the surveillance to be undertaken has a legitimate aim (i.e., that it is intended to be 
used to prevent a threat, and not to “out” an individual). Once a sufficient legal basis 
and legitimate aim is found, the third prong requires an analysis of whether the 
surveillance is necessary in a democratic society (i.e., does the surveillance “answer 
a pressing social need and is it proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued?”).54 
This three-part test incorporates an aspect of the proportionality analysis 
discussed above. Whereby if the proposed surveillance measure meets the first two 
prongs of legality, it must still be a proportional measure to be undertaken in the 
circumstances. However, the third prong of this test is explicit in its applicability 
only to democratic nations and does not address these same concerns in a nation with 
another structure of government. 
The proposed three-part test focuses on the legal basis of a democratic nation 
and applies the analysis of the proposed surveillance measure to that framework. 
This implicitly assumes that there would be a legal basis including legislation which 
addresses the use of surveillance, and a government in place which would respect or 
abide by such laws, and if it does not, that can be held accountable for such missteps. 
“Evaluating the legal basis, and the quality of this legal basis, is dependent on 
the specific legal framework applicable in a given jurisdiction, while the uses of 
surveillance measures by intelligence and security services typically satisfy the 
legitimate aim test on the basis of protecting national security or public order.”55 
Furthermore, the concept of necessity as broached by this three-part test, looks 
to an analysis of the “utility of the benefit” from the proposed surveillance measure, 
as viewed through a “value-laden assessment of the worth of these distinct and 
potential uses.”56 In the case studies above this would mean looking at the utility of 
the benefit of the level of surveillance in the Xinjiang province, as providing the state 
with information, when considered in an assessment of the worth of the uses of that 
information both explicitly stated and those that are implied potential uses. In the 
                                                          
53 Murray & Fussey, supra note 3, at 33. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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China case study, arguably the assessment would come out with the consideration 
being against the continued use of such extreme surveillance of the population. 
B. For Protection of Human Rights 
The human rights analysis of surveillance and bulk data focuses on whether the 
surveillance is “strictly necessary for the obtaining of vital intelligence in an 
individual operation.”57 This distinction in the approach to Big Data (bulk data), is 
an important one, creating a high threshold which must be met before surveillance 
measures can be used. In conjunction with the tests considered above, this distinction 
could also be scaled down to the individual claim level as well, where this threshold 
must be met, and a proportionality balancing test should be conducted before such 
measures are used. 
 “In determining how human rights law could more effectively respond to 
bulk communications monitoring, four factors should be taken into account: 
(i) the extent of information that can be revealed by communications data; 
(ii) the extent to which harm associated with the retention of communications 
data affects other rights; (iii) the ease of analysing communications data; and 
(iv) the operational utility of bulk collection.”58 
This proposed test places heavy significance on the potential that such 
surveillance measures may have on what information is revealed and how that 
information may affect other rights. The test focuses on the actual and the probable 
effects of the proposed surveillance measures, and what the logical conclusions are 
of those measures. This enables a more holistic view of the use of data, rather than 
only looking at what the proposed purpose is of the surveillance measures. 
V. CRITIQUES AND SUGGESTIONS 
Many scholars in the fields of international relations, human rights, and data 
collection respectively have called attention to the issues addressed in this paper in 
various ways. In addition to scholarship on the issues, they also offer critiques and 
suggestions on models proposed to attempt to resolve these issues. 
One of the critiques of the use of surveillance data in general is that it leads to 
harms outside of the specific area addressed. For example, evidence points to harms 
such as: “chilling effects; and shifting modes of suspicion—subdivided into issues 
of labelling and mental health.”59 Chilling effects include the self-policing of one’s 
online activities based on the understanding that you may be under surveillance, in 
                                                          
57 Id. at 41. 
58 Id. at 50. 
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an attempt to prevent identification as a member of a group. An example of this 
would be the use of social media in China, where Uyghur’s are deleting family 
members’ information and policing what they say when texting or messaging on 
apps. This self-policing impacts their everyday lives and ties into the issues 
surrounding mental health as well as the fear for their own safety of those around 
them. 
Another critique of the use of surveillance and the collection of bulk data is that 
there is a lack of discrimination in selecting whose information is collected. “Bulk 
monitoring elevates millions into the realm of the potentially suspicious in a 
narrowed field of enquiry. In such circumstances, suspicion does not precede data 
collection—surveillance is not initiated on the basis of ‘reasonable suspicion.’ 
Rather, it is generated by analysis of the data itself.”60 This is a key issue of the 
debate surrounding human rights and data analysis because the data collection and 
analysis itself creates the “suspicion” upon which the use of surveillance and 
monitoring is justified. This catch-22 situation enables governments and 
organizations to argue that access to and continued use of surveillance data is 
necessary to enable them to determine who could pose a threat to national security. 
However, such an argument far oversteps the proportionality assessment discussed 
above, with the actual harm—violations of the right to privacy, freedom of speech, 
and the effect of self-policing, among others—outweighing the potential gain of 
identifying potential threats. Rather than this approach to the use of data, a more 
finetuned and streamlined approach should be taken. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The questions raised are: can an international system or framework be 
developed and effectively implemented that would enable the use of Big Data while 
protecting against violations of the rights of those being monitored? Additionally, 
would such a framework be able to operate across varied nation-states? 
Many scholars agree that one avenue to create a legal framework or structure 
on the use of data is through utilising the system of creation of international norms, 
applicable as customary international law (and thus non-derogable unless the state 
had objected to the norm from its creation). With the creation of international norms 
and customary international law, the main issue is that this process is one that takes 
time. A norm is not developed overnight, and a norm does not become customary 
international law immediately. However, taking steps towards developing such a 
norm is a viable option for the international community and nation-states to consider. 
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One such example is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, a 
regional treaty which builds on the rights laid out in the UN Charter, and adapts them 
to be applied to Big Data.61 While there is a lot more that can be said about the 
development of international customary law and international norms, that is not the 
focus of this paper, and will be dealt with in more generalized terms in order to 
further develop the question at issue here.62 
In the interim, both as an option on its own, as well as in conjunction with the 
purpose of developing international customary laws, nation-states and other 
organizations (such as the UN, and treaty organizations) can create international 
monitoring bodies and treaty law. Such a proposed agreement would focus on the 
use of surveillance by nation-states within the borders and targeting the citizens of 
other nation-states, and should be expanded to include an agreement not to violate 
universally recognized human rights (which are non-derogable under the UN Charter 
for Human Rights and the Rome Statute which codify customary international law). 
The steps that a multilateral agreement should set out to be followed, in 
preventing the abuse of access to data and surveillance, are as follows: First, the 
agreement should lay out that the object and purpose of the framework is to protect 
the rights of citizens in relation to the state, and of the sovereign nation-state in 
relation to other states, ensuring that there is no encroachment on these rights. 
Second, the agreement should establish a framework laying the boundaries of the 
agreement both as to the reach of the agreement and the boundaries that the nation-
states must abide by. The boundaries of the reach of the agreement must be such that 
while monitoring the use of data by a state, the sovereignty of the state, and its right 
to protect itself are not imposed upon. The boundaries the nation-states must abide 
by are a more complex undertaking, which would need to be discussed and debated 
amongst the states implementing the agreement. Some recommendations of aspects 
to include are: that the agreement should establish an objective monitoring body 
which is tasked with reporting to the member-states the compliance with the 
requirements set out in the agreement by the members; and there must also be an 
enforcement mechanism available to the members, whether that is through 
arbitration, self-help, or adjudication—either by a neutral third party such as the ICJ, 
or by a body created from the agreement. 
What does compliance with an international framework look like? As 
mentioned above, compliance would include respecting the rights of citizens and 
individuals when making use of data, as well as respecting the sovereignty of other 
                                                          
61 Commission Proclamation on Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 
49. 
62 See Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. OF INT’L L. 
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nation-states. Beyond that, a framework should establish at what point does 
accessing data become “using” data: is it when the data is taken in bulk from the 
consumers and individuals; is it when the bulk data is sorted via algorithms into 
databases and data sets; or is it when the human element is introduced, analyzing the 
compilations of data? If it is the second option, of the compilation of data that defines 
“use,” then the framework should create guidelines and rules surrounding this 
accessing of data and the compilation into data sets that are permissible under 
international law. For example, the use of data to compile databases on members of 
minority groups (ethnic, religious, sexual orientation, etc.), should be prohibited, 
unless such information is freely given by the individual (i.e., if there is a census and 
the individual voluntarily identifies themselves as a member of such a group). For 
the government to unilaterally develop such a data set of information without the 
consent of the targeted groups is dangerous and as is evident in the Russia and China 
case studies, can lead to discrimination, persecution, torture and threats of harm, 
including physical, psychological, economic, and social harms. 
